On February 9, 2010, MQA began regular way trading (i.e., normal T+3 settlement), closing at A$0.715. This represents a c.79% discount to pro forma NAV of A$3.35 per share, while Intoll (ITO AU) is trading at a c.31% discount to its pro forma NAV of A$1.71 per share. As we pointed out in our Global Spin-Off Report on the Intoll/MQA split, published on January 22, 2010, there are good reasons to suggest that MQA deserves to trade at a steeper discount to its NAV than Intoll, notably its higher leveraged toll road assets and consequent refinancing risks. However, the appropriate level of discount to MQA’s asset value is highly subjective, bearing in mind that the application of higher discount rates applied to discounting the cash flows from MQA’s investments should already reflect the risk relative to Intoll’s assets (i.e., the average discount rate applied by MQA is c.380 bps above the average rate applied by Intoll). Taking this into account, it could be argued that a c.50%-60% discount to NAV, equivalent to the largest discounts at which the now defunct Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG) historically traded, would be a more appropriate valuation level for MQA. This would imply a share price of A$1.35-A$1.70 per share based on MQA’s reported NAV as of December 31, 2009.
Looking at MQA’s pro forma net asset valuation, more than 80% of MQA’s NAV (ex. cash) is comprised of three toll road assets (APRR, M6 Toll and Dulles Greenway). In this respect, the key valuation driver for MQA is the refinancing risk associated with the company’s principal assets. It is important to emphasize that all such risk is contained within each individual asset alone. MQA is unleveraged at the corporate level and the asset level debt is non-recourse to MQA. Moreover, the debt is non cross-collateralized and has no cross-default provisions, leaving each asset to stand or fall on its own merit. Of the principal assets, the M6 Toll and APRR give MQA the biggest refinancing challenges.
APRR – MQA owns an effective 20.37% stake in Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhone, a 2,234-kilometer (c.1, 388 miles) motorway network located in eastern France, which is the fourth largest tolled network in Europe. MQA’s investment in APRR (ARR FP), which is publicly-listed on the Euronext Paris Stock Exchange, is held through a participation in Eiffarie (a consortium led by French construction group Eiffage), which holds a c.81.5% stake in APRR. Debt in MQA’s French investment is held at the Eiffarie and APRR levels. In terms of refinancing risk, Eiffarie/APRR debt represents MQA’s most immediate challenge with more than 60% of the investment’s debt profile or €6.17 billion (on a 100% basis) maturing over the next three years, including €3.8 billion of Eiffarie level debt maturing in February 2013. However, this challenge should not prove to be insurmountable for the following reasons:
1) APRR is very cash generative with net debt (including Eiffarie debt) to EBITDA currently at a reasonably salutary 8.8x. Cash generated is currently being retained at the asset level under a mechanism built into debt agreements known as a cash sweep, whereby a portion of free cash flow is mandatorily ‘swept’ to pay down debt principal with the remainder being available to distribute to equity. Cash distributions to MQA from Eiffarie/APRR have been dropping since fiscal year 2007 as more cash has been retained at the asset level for debt repayment purposes. MQA is not expected to see any cash distribution from its French investment over the next three years as all the cash is likely to be retained within Eiffarie/APRR due to the upcoming debt repayment schedules. However, this and an improved credit market environment should strongly reduce refinancing risks. In fact, it is envisaged that Eiffarie will refinance its €3.8 billion debt facility in 2012, before its maturity in February 2013.
2) Another potential refinancing solution is for the Eiffarie consortium to sell down its stake in APRR to European institutions. In this respect, it is worth noting that the APRR’s current market value of €5.9 billion is almost quadruple the asset value implied by MQA’s DCF valuation as of June 30, 2009.
M6 Toll – This 100%-owned 42 kilometer (c.26 miles) toll road in the UK potentially represents MQA’s biggest refinancing challenge. M6 Toll is a highly leveraged asset with a net debt to EBITDA ratio of c.22x as of June 30, 2009 (the last reported figure), although the debt service coverage ratio is comfortable at over 2x, as a result of the low interest swap rate for the facility (there is a 30 year-fixed interest rate swap for the facility, charging 1% per annum until December 2010, increasing thereafter by 50 bps each year to 8.5% in 2025, then an ongoing rate of 7.92% per annum until the end of the term in 2036, with a 37 bps credit swap margin fixed over the entire term). The asset’s total net debt of £1.03 billion (including a capex facility of £30 million) is due to mature on August 23, 2015. While this still more than five years away, MQA’s current valuation appears to suggest that the market is painting a gloomy picture, with some suggesting that MQA will have to use its own cash to deleverage the asset. If so, we believe this an overly pessimistic view on at least two counts:
1) Certainly, we would agree that if MQA had to refinance M6 Toll’s debt today, it is certain that the banks would not be accommodating without the requirement to deleverage the asset. However, it is well to remember that refinancing of the asset is not due for another five years hence, and chances are that the operating and credit environments will improve from the prevailing one, characterized by a UK economy mired in its deepest recession for decades, as well as one in which the global credit markets have been shut tight for much of the past fifteen months.
Traffic performance at M6 Toll, a relief road for the Midlands section of the M6 motorway (the UK’s longest motorway), has been underwhelming recently (down c.10% in fiscal year 2009, and down c.2% year-on–year in the July-December 2009 period), reflecting the very weak UK economy as well as upgrade work to nearby stretches of the M6 motorway. Nevertheless, both revenue and EBITDA generation have demonstrated resilience (both were down by only c. 2% in fiscal year 2009) with traffic decline largely offset by toll increases and improved operating efficiencies. Since fiscal year 2005, M6 Toll revenue and EBITDA have risen at an annual compound growth rate of c.7% and c.11% respectively. The M6 Toll, which is currently running at less than half its capacity, should eventually benefit from a recovering UK economy and the completion of the upgrade work to the M6 motorway next year.
Using an assumption of about half the historic growth rate in EBITDA, say 5%-6% per annum, to the start of fiscal year 2016 (when refinancing is due), would imply an EBITDA of c. £70 million in fiscal year 2015, and a net debt to EBITDA of 14x to 15x. This would probably still be viewed as a little above the comfort level for financing institutions, but there is also a cash sweep mandated in the terms of the debt facility starting from August 2011, which we estimate could pay down c.£150 million of debt, reducing the ratio to c.12x-13x by August 2015. According to our calculation, this would yield an initial interest rate cover in the 1.5x-2.0x range (based on swap rates of 4%-5%, which would be in line with terms incorporated in the existing swap agreement). This level of leverage, therefore, could be received more willingly by the banks. In a more benign environment, MQA could of course try to sell down its 100% stake in M6 Toll to further deleverage the asset.
2) MQA’s management has told us that there are no sacred cows in its portfolio and that it would not deleverage an asset with MQA’s equity unless it would be value accretive. Consequently, in the absence of an improvement in operating performance by M6 Toll or if MQA found it difficult to refinance the asset’s debt on reasonable terms, MQA would simply walk away from the asset. In these circumstances, there would be no impact on MQA other than a write down of the equity value of M6 Toll, which is valued at £202 million in MQA’s latest reported portfolio valuation.
Our earlier premise that a c.60% discount to MQA’s pro forma NAV may be a more appropriate valuation is backed by a second approach. In this approach, we have assumed zero equity value for all of MQA’s assets other than its non-investment balances (i.e., cash) and its stake in APRR, which has visible value as it is publicly-listed. However, we conservatively value APRR using MQA’s last reported DCF valuation in euros, translated at the current exchange A$/€ exchange rate. The A$406 million APRR valuation is only one-fifth of the current market value (A$1.9 billion) of MQA’s APRR stake. Consequently, we arrive at a NAV for MQA of A$1.35 per share, equivalent to a 60% discount to the reported pro forma NAV of A$3.35 per share.
While we can expect volatile trading in MQA shares to continue in the short term, we maintain our view that the stock represents a relatively cheap option on improving global credit market conditions and a bet on the eventual successful refinancing of MQA’s assets. Our analysis indicates the share price offers significant upside (c.89% to our target price of A$1.35 per share) from current levels.
As of February 9, 2010, Intoll (A$1.175 per share) was trading just below our fair value range of A$1.20-A$1.40 per share. We would consider putting Intoll on our BUY recommendation list if the stock falls below A$1.15 per share, for a potential return in excess of 20%.